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The main argument of this article is that 
public decision-making has an anthropo-
centric focus that lacks explanatory pow-
er. An alternative approach is suggested. 
This approach reframes decision-making 
as a process of coevolution between deci-
sion-makers and the system they attempt 
to govern. Coevolution can explain the oc-
currence of unintended, unforeseen and 
unwanted consequences of decisions. The 
framework is applied to analyze a case of 
planning port extensions in Hamburg, 
Germany, in order to demonstrate the 
workings of the coevolutionary approach 
to public decision-making processes. 
Introduction
Public decision-making over physical systems often has an anthropocentric perspective. That is: it is (implicitly or 
explicitly) assumed that the decision-maker 
is in full control of the physical system. There 
are no issues with this approach as long as the 
physical system responds predictably. But of-
ten the responses are erratic, badly predictable 
and, sometimes, unfavorable. In such cases, 
people tend to blame decision-makers for tak-
ing the wrong decision. However, that ignores 
that decision-making take place in a capricious 
world, and that decisions are distorted because 
of the erratic behavior of systems. In order to 
analyze the complexity of decision-making, 
one has to assume a complex systems perspec-
tive as the point of departure. Such an analysis 
should take into account that causation is com-
plex and changeable over time, and it should 
abandon the anthropocentric perspective for a 
coevolutionary revision. 
 This article argues that the concept of 
coevolution helps understanding the erratic 
nature of decision-making better than more 
traditional approaches. This idea is clarified 
through a case study of the extension of the 
port of Hamburg. The next section introduces 
this case study. The third section is dedicat-
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ed to the introduction of the coevolutionary 
framework for decision-making that allows 
understanding the outcomes of the case. The 
conclusions are presented in the final section. 
Planning Port Extensions
The Elbe provides maritime access to Hamburg in Germany, one of Europe’s largest ports and an economic power-
house. The port authorities (HPA) feel obliged 
to plan port extensions because this is per-
ceived as the main strategy in order to stay 
ahead of the competition elsewhere in Europe. 
Hamburg seeks to increase the capacity among 
others by planning a new motorway from east 
to west (see Van Gils et al., 2009). Another 
proposed measure to increase the port’s capac-
ity is to deepen the navigation channel of the 
Elbe River between the port and the North 
Sea. This section measures approximately 100 
kilometers. Large cargo ships are too large to 
enter the port around the clock because of the 
shallow depth. They are obliged to wait until 
the tide is high enough to safeguard the depth 
under the keel. A deeper Elbe would allow 
these ships to enter port any time during the 
day. The Elbe has been deepened several times 
between 1900 and 2007. After the deepening 
in 1980, the port authorities and the Senate of 
Hamburg planned another deepening opera-
tion that was to be completed somewhere be-
tween 1995 and 2000. The planning process 
gained momentum during 1996, when this 
case study starts. Data was collected through 
interviews and document analysis. Twenty 
semi-structured in-depth interviews were 
conducted during summer—fall 2007 in Ger-
many. Document analysis covered over 175 
newspaper articles, policy documents and sci-
entific publications published about the case. 
Newspaper articles were triangulated using 
multiple sources. A full list of respondents and 
all articles and documents is published in Ger-
rits, 2008. 
 When the planning process starts in 
1996, it is hampered by fierce resistance from 
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many stakeholders such as environmental 
pressure groups and concerned citizens. The 
port authorities and the Senate are convinced 
that the deepening will benefit the region tre-
mendously in terms of employment and pros-
perity. Opponents on the other hand argue 
that it adds marginally to economics growth 
and they fear that it comes at the cost of the en-
vironment, safety and quality of life. There is 
also opposition from the neighboring federal 
states Niedersachsen and Schleswig-Holstein. 
They are afraid that any damage to the envi-
ronment has to be compensates by them rather 
than by Hamburg, since the Elbe runs through 
their territory. 
 Fearing the effects of public resistance 
on the planning progress, HPA and the Senate 
try to shield it away from public pressures and 
try to speed up the process as much as possible. 
The obligatory environmental impact assess-
ment (EIA) is delayed but the operation gets 
the nod anyway in 1996, long before the EIA is 
published. The assessment arrives in 1997 and 
by that time the port authorities have already 
advanced their planning. The EIA indicates 
that the deepening can be carried out without 
major unfavorable consequences for the en-
vironment but a monitoring program will be 
established in order to monitor the effects of 
the deepening. While the EIA marks the start 
of the formal planning procedure, including 
the possibilities to object against the deepen-
ing, HPA announces that it will start to remove 
the first layer from the riverbed immediately, 
in what it calls a ‘preparatory dredging’ opera-
tion. Throughout the region, the stakeholders 
are infuriated because of this strategy. 
 When possible, HPA and the Senate 
try to settle the conflict through financial com-
pensation. Other objections are more difficult 
to deal with. Niedersachsen and Schleswig-
Holstein are forced to cooperate in the end. 
Many stakeholders submit complaints during 
the formal planning procedure. However, the 
organization that is to judge these complaints 
is the same one that plans the deepening and 
the complaints are brushed aside. It decides 
that these groups are illegitimate parties and 
therefore there is no obligation to respond to 
them. The preparatory dredging operation 
goes ahead, followed by the actual deepening 
operation and a concluding ceremony on De-
cember 14, 1998. 
Pushing Forward a New Deepening
Much of the uproar fades away after the deepening. Niedersachsen senses that the growth in the cargo shipping 
will continue in the foreseeable future and 
plans the construction of a deep-sea terminal at 
Wilhelmshaven at the North Sea coast near the 
Elbe. The purpose of this terminal is to create 
additional capacity for the turnover of goods, 
especially for those ships that are too large to 
travel on the Elbe. Now it is the turn for Ham-
burg to be very concerned about a plan. It fears 
that the new port relatively nearby will draw 
ships away. Consequently, it starts talking 
about another deepening operation that could 
accommodate the largest ships destined for the 
future Wilhelmshaven terminal. The mayor of 
Hamburg manages to strike a deal with Nied-
ersachsen that gives Niedersachsen its much-
desired terminal because Hamburg promises 
to finance 20% of it in return for support for yet 
another deepening. 
 However, re-elections in the summer 
of 2001 herald a change in Hamburg, with the 
Christian Democratic Party (CDU) now head-
ing the department dealing with the port and 
appointing Mr. Gunnar Uldall as its Senator. 
Uldall was strongly against the agreement be-
tween Niedersachsen and Hamburg and one 
of his first measures is to announce that Ham-
burg will not take up its 20 percent share in the 
deep-sea terminal project. Instead, he aims to 
deepen the Elbe as soon as possible in order to 
secure a potential market share that otherwise 
might come to Wilhelmshaven. He appoints a 
civil working group to investigate the possibil-
ity of conducting a new deepening operation. 
Although he says that Niedersachsen agrees 
with this move, Niedersachsen itself asserts 
that it has not. There is also fierce resistance 
from the stakeholders. Uldall pushes ahead 
with his plans and aims for a quick decision. 
 The civil working group, however, 
is less confident about the feasibility. They 
are struggling with the compensation mea-
sures from the previous deepening. Although 
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they have made suggestions on how to real-
ize aquatic compensation, putting these ideas 
into practice proves to be very complicated. 
Compensation measures are therefore focused 
on the terrestrial dimension but this poses an-
other range of problems. There are few spots 
along the river banks where room can be found 
for such compensation. This is a problem be-
cause compensation for the previous deepen-
ing is mandatory and because it could even get 
more difficult if a new operation is carried out. 
In the end, Hamburg argues that some of the 
observed physical changes to the Elbe cannot 
be contributed to the previous deepening op-
eration anyway and should not be taken into 
account when debating compensation. In oth-
er words: compensation does not need to be as 
intensive as planned before. Despite all good 
intentions, compensation is deemed to be only 
a marginal success among the civil working 
groups and on April 4, 2002, Uldall announces 
that Hamburg will deepen once again, 3 years 
after the previous deepening. The civil work-
ing group releases a report in October 2002, 
stating that the deepening can be carried out 
without major unfavorable effects. 
 The planning of the new deepening 
goes ahead during the years that follow. The 
period is marked by a continuous exchange of 
views between all actors. HPA starts to orga-
nize meetings in the region to provide infor-
mation about the next deepening. Uldall urges 
to publish a preliminary monitoring report. 
Some argue that it is not yet possible to ob-
serve any physical changes because morpho-
logical changes to the riverbed take around 10 
to 15 years to appear. However, a rapport is 
published and the fact that it shows that there 
were no changes so soon after the deepening is 
announced as evidence that the previous deep-
ening was without unfavorable consequences. 
 Away from the public eye, however, 
officials acknowledge that the previous deep-
ening caused an increase in the tidal range 
(the difference between ebb and flood). There 
are also problems with sediment transport 
that may arise due to increased tidal velocity 
in the river. The new dredging works are not 
expected to require considerable reallocation 
of sediments but the changing tidal currents 
may cross this point of departure. Officials feel 
even more pressure to have a deepening with-
out unfavorable effects because the river has 
become part of the EU Habitat Directive and 
this means that there is less room for modifi-
cations. Hamburg manages to exempt the port 
itself from the Directive, but other operations 
need an additional assessment. 
 Having passed this hurdle, Hamburg 
moves on to tackle the row with Niedersach-
sen and Schleswig-Holstein. Hamburg’s may-
or realizes that the states will push their port 
at Wilhelmshaven regardless of any support 
from Hamburg so he decides that it is more 
useful to support the port in exchange for sup-
port for the deepening. A document is signed 
and all actors promise not to obstruct each oth-
er. The next step is to get the societal groups to 
accept a deepening. To this end, a mediation 
process is established.  
An Unpleasant Surprise
While the policy makers are work-ing on securing a further deepen-ing, they are suddenly faced with a 
major unfavorable physical change in the Un-
terelbe. Dredgers find that the amount of mate-
rial dredged during maintenance operations in 
2004 is considerably higher than during pre-
vious years (see Figure 1). Soundings confirm 
their observation, i.e., that the amount of sedi-
ments flowing in from the North Sea and accu-
mulating in the harbor basin has suddenly in-
creased from 4,5 million cubic m3 in 2003 to 
9 million cubic m3 a year later. This comes as 
a major surprise to all actors. A small increase 
had been predicted in the EIA but no one fore-
saw this large of an increase. It poses a major 
problem for all proponents of the deepening. 
 The first of these problems are esca-
lating costs arising from an urgent need to in-
tensify dredging because sediments are now 
obstructing navigation in the port. The sec-
ond problem is the lack of space to dispose of 
the sediments. Having no more space avail-
able within the city, Hamburg needs to turn 
to its neighbors but following the many rows 
with Niedersachsen and Schleswig-Holstein 
it does not gain any clearance to store the sedi-
ments within their territory. HPA therefore 
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chooses to go back to an earlier solution: to 
take the sediments to the border of their terri-
tory, dump them in the river, and hope that the 
tidal currents will then take them to the North 
Sea. This doesn’t happen, as it is the North Sea 
where the sediments come from in the first 
place. Consequently, HPA has to dredge the 
port over and over again in an almost vicious 
dredging cycle.  
 Although it is very complicated to as-
sess how each individual measure has con-
tributed to this change, there are a number 
of mechanisms that can explain this sudden 
increase of sedimentation. It began prior to 
the most recent deepening and maintenance 
dredging operations have always been neces-
sary. However, some officials acknowledge 
that the deepening operation has contributed 
tremendously to this development by altering 
the stable state of the river in such a way as to 
disproportionately accelerate sedimentation in 
the port. 
 The incident marks a change within 
the homogeneous group of officials preparing 
the deepening. At the one hand there are those 
who favor a new deepening and who are deep-
ly concerned about the progress of their plans. 
They view the physical changes as a coinci-
dence rather than a consequence of the deep-
ening. At the other hand, there are people who 
start to think that the deepening of the river 
is not the best way for the future and the start 
pleading for a change of direction. The latter 
represent a minority view. But while officials 
debate the causes of the physical changes, there 
is ongoing pressure to do something about it—
Figure 1 Sediment accumulation in the Elbe between 1990 and 2005.
The total volume of sediments is indicated by the black line. The total volume comprises sediments that are 
processed locally, e.g., storage, remediation (grey columns), and sediments that are dumped at the territorial 
borders of the City of Hamburg (black columns). The grey line indicates the fresh water discharge at Neu 
Darchau (Gerrits, 2008, adapted from Bundesanstalt fur Wasserbau, 2005). 
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if only because the accumulation of sediments 
crosses the reason d’etre of the deepening. The 
press in Hamburg is unanimous in their ver-
dict. They state that the officials are blinded by 
their ambition to get a new deepening, conse-
quently overlooking or underestimating the 
potential risks of doing this. They point at the 
monitoring program that was scheduled to run 
for an additional 10 years before a new deepen-
ing would be considered. With hindsight, the 
very early publication of the monitoring report 
was a poor move. 
 At first sight, one would agree with 
the local press. However, although there were 
some politicians who were certainly pushing 
forward with their case, there were also of-
ficials who were genuinely taken by surprise 
by the physical changes. One could then argue 
that the research for the deepening was faulty 
and that the inability to predict this change is 
down to the researchers’ lack of knowledge. 
 However, this kind of thinking does 
not take into account the unpredictable nature 
of physical systems. Even the most elaborate 
studies and models are unable to capture this 
unpredictability to its full extent. This is prob-
lematic because uncertainty over future de-
velopments does not allow for the clarity that 
is required to make an informed decision. As 
stated by Otter in the context of coastal zones 
development: “a fully deterministic approach 
[as required in the political arena—LG] can-
not handle the uncertainty related to the man-
agement of many environmental systems.” 
(2000: 110). Taking this further, the actors 
themselves could be the cause of the develop-
ments that turn out to be unfavorable to them. 
One must bear in mind that physical systems 
are not passive. They respond dynamically and 
unpredictably to policy decisions, which could 
yield unfavorable results. One should move 
beyond the obvious explanations in order to 
understand the full complexity of decision-
making processes.
Coevolution between Systems
The first step in understanding how seemingly sound decisions can lead to adverse effects on physical systems is to 
understand that decisions and the actors who 
make these decisions are an integral part of the 
chain of causes and consequences that drives 
physical change (Hooke, 1999; Turner, 2000). 
When a physical system on the one hand and 
decision-makers and public decision-mak-
ing processes on the other hand both evolve 
through mutual interaction in an unpredict-
able way, this is a form of coevolution. Coevo-
lution, its drivers and its consequences for de-
cision making are the core theme of this article. 
 The term coevolution was coined by 
Ehrlich and Raven, who observed that groups 
of organisms evolved through reciprocal se-
lective interaction (1964, in: Odum, 1971). 
While mutation can be explained by observ-
ing selection pressures on an organism from 
the environment, coevolution explains that 
this mutation in turn affects the environment 
of that organism. The explanatory power of 
coevolution for change is therefore situated in 
the pattern of mutual influence that can arise 
between organisms or, in the context of this 
research, between complex adaptive systems. 
The coevolutionary principle has emerged in 
other domains as well, although not always 
under the same heading. For a theory to have 
an evolutionary character, it should assume a 
directional tendency to change, whether by 
progression or regression, as well as explana-
tory mechanisms that drive this change, bear-
ing in mind that these mechanisms are local 
rather than presumed universal (Sanderson, 
1990). Sanderson states that there are a grow-
ing number of accounts that regard socio-cul-
tural change as a result of coevolution between 
a biological system with genetic mechanisms 
and a cultural system with non-genetic mecha-
nisms. This introduces the idea that biological 
or physical systems and social systems can be 
considered to be intertwined in a coevolution-
ary relationship in which there is reciprocal se-
lection between these seemingly incompatible 
systems.
Coevolution and Decision-Making
Norgaard (1984; 1994) states that co-evolutionary development has been occurring for millennia as people at-
tempt to use physical systems to their benefit, 
as exemplified by this case study. In doing this 
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people engage in a pattern of feedback loops. 
While physical systems respond to human de-
cisions, social systems respond to the ensuing 
changes from the physical system, which the 
physical system then responds to with yet an-
other set of changes. Over time, the complex-
ity of this pattern renders it nearly impossible 
to attribute any particular development to a 
specific feedback loop as the two systems have 
become completely intertwined.
 These feedback loops between the sys-
tems can be considered to be selection pres-
sures as they can have a determining impact 
on future possibilities for the systems. This, 
then, is the coevolutionary argument about so-
cial and physical complex adaptive systems in a 
nutshell. While the core of coevolution, name-
ly reciprocal selection, concerns content (i.e., 
what is selected and what are the consequences 
to the state of the system), the coevolutionary 
approach adopted by Norgaard, among others, 
introduces the elements of structure (complex 
adaptive systems and agency) and elements of 
process (positive and negative feedback follow-
ing deliberate selection, punctuated change, 
hysteresis, path-dependency and lock-in). 
 Consequently, a theoretical framework 
that allows analyzing decision-making as a co-
evolutionary process should take the follow-
ing into account. Firstly, isolating the object 
of research from its environment decreases 
its explanatory power. Secondly, a systemic 
framework must take into account that there 
is mutual interaction between the diverse 
systems. Thirdly, complex causation does not 
stem only from the multiple causes and ef-
fects but also from erratic change. This means 
that the relationship between cause and ef-
fect could be altered through the occurrence 
of events or could lead to different develop-
mental pathways if repeated elsewhere in time 
and/or location (Byrne, 2005). Fourthly, the 
mechanisms of coevolution can be named and 
mapped.
 That public decision-making is not a 
strict hierarchy but takes place in networks 
is already established and there is an obvious 
connection between policy networks and sys-
tems as networks are systemic by definition (cf. 
Klijn & Snellen, 2009; Morçöl & Wachhaus, 
2009). This perspective can be further refined 
from a complexity theory perspective. Empiri-
cally, the actors in cases define the boundaries 
of the systems or networks. For example, they 
define the physical system by deciding what is 
included and what is not included. In this case 
study, there was a clear tendency among policy 
makers during the early stages to use a narrow 
definition that centered around the water it-
self, whereas for example the environmental 
pressure groups used a broader definition, in-
cluding the land behind the dikes. These defi-
nitions change over time. Besides this, actors 
also define their own system with people who 
are included or excluded. The case shows that 
the system of officials evolved over time with 
people changing their opinion about the op-
eration. The ambiguous stance of Niedersach-
sen and Schleswig-Holstein is an example of 
how officials change their perception and thus 
change the constitution of the policy system. 
Consequently, the boundaries of systems are 
porous and evolve along the system definitions 
of actors. The act of defining the system by ac-
tors in cases must be understood in order to 
understand decision-making processes, rather 
than trying to arrive at second-order boundary 
judgment (Cilliers, 2001). The actors’ percep-
tion of what defines the system is decisive in 
determining what is included in the system, as 
it is from this perception that they act accord-
ingly.
 At the heart of coevolutionary process-
es lies the concept of reciprocal selection. The 
concepts of ‘feedback’ and ‘selection pressure’ 
appear to be closely related but the difference 
between them is not purely semantic. Coevo-
lution thrives on positive feedback loops (Nor-
gaard, 1994) as they provoke adaptation and 
thus, a change in the state of systems. Feedback 
therefore becomes selection pressure as a re-
sponse to an incentive leading to change. This 
poses two questions: what is being selected 
and how is it selected?
 The answer to the first question is that 
the future state of a complex adaptive system is 
being selected. The adaptation to a certain in-
centive means a change in the systems’ states 
but, following the processes of path-dependen-
cy and lock-in, this in turn means that certain 
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sequences of systems’ states become possible 
while others are relegated outside the range of 
what is feasible. This process applies to both 
physical and social systems. For example, the 
decision to deepen the river denies it the possi-
bility of silting up and meandering to a differ-
ent course. Conversely, a physical change such 
as the rapid increase in sediment accumulation 
pushes officials into a reactive role as they face 
an unfavorable situation to which they have to 
respond regardless of their earlier intentions. 
Reciprocal selection therefore means that the 
future state of systems is determined by selec-
tion pressures from both systems.
 The answer to the second question, 
namely how the future state is selected, is also 
of importance here. Selecting options is pre-
ceded by creating variety of options. Aldrich 
and Ruef (1999) note that intentional varia-
tion is driven by active attempts by actors to 
find solutions while blind variation occurs 
through events independent from actors’ be-
havior. In coevolution, the creation of variety 
and selecting variety is part of the same feed-
back loop (Foster & Hölz, 2004; Hrebiniak & 
Joyce, 1985). 
 The case study illustrates that actors 
struggle with determining the impact of their 
decisions. They argue that favorable outcomes 
are due to their decisions whereas unfavor-
able outcomes are attributed to chance or the 
unwanted actions of others. The discussions 
about the cause of the sudden sediment accu-
mulation are an example of that. This osten-
sible absence of clear causation may give the 
impression that, while intended selection is 
perceptible, certain variation cannot be related 
and is, therefore, blind. The argument here is 
that complex causation could indeed create 
that impression but that variation in the future 
can still be triggered by current selection, even 
when this variation is unintended, unobserved 
and unexpected. Consequently, there are two 
basic types of reciprocal selection: perceptible 
and blind, each exerting its own selection pres-
sures on the systems. 
 Perceptible selection is an intended re-
sult of choices made by actors. They assess the 
current situation, define a desired state of the 
system and draw up a solution to change the 
current situation into the desired situation. For 
example, HPA aims to receive larger ships, they 
deem the current depth insufficient to achieve 
this aim and consequently make a plan for the 
deepening of the navigation channel that they 
execute. In other words, they exert a selection 
pressure on the physical system. This creates a 
renewed situation from which they can con-
tinue to work, i.e., it determines the variation 
available to actors at a later stage.
 However, the cause of this selection 
pressure is not necessarily clear. Although a 
clear and intended change in the other system 
could occur, it is also possible that a certain 
action may lead to no changes or unintended 
changes. The timeframe of these changes can 
be erratic, with results sometimes appearing 
immediately while there may be long delays in 
others cases. Due to the limited information 
capacity of actors, the consequence of a partic-
ular action may appear to be detached. Because 
this consequent action also results in changes 
to a situation and determines the variation 
available at a later stage, this is blind selection, 
i.e., variation that is seemingly detached from 
the act of selecting but that, in fact, is not. For 
example, changes to the sediment transport 
of the river can be attributed to several deci-
sions made by officials, but its exact causation 
is almost impossible to determine. However, 
it still pressures them to act even though its 
cause is obscure and might, in fact, be a result 
of the decisions made by the same people. 
 The erratic nature of blind selection can 
be explained by processes known in complex-
ity theory. Selection pressures constitute feed-
back loops that can be positive or negative and 
can lead to the occurrence of change, punctu-
ated equilibrium, hysteresis, path-dependency 
and lock-in effects, all of which render the re-
sult different in time and place from the initial 
intention (Gerrits, 2008). The resulting situ-
ation defines the degree of freedom available. 
Selection can therefore be blind because of the 
disposition of processes in complexity while 
still being reciprocal because of the mutual in-
fluence of systems to determine their future 
states. The nature of perceptible and blind re-
ciprocal selection as part of coevolutionary 
processes raises the ostensible complexity and 
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inherent uncertainty experienced by actors. 
 Taken together, all selection pressures 
present a complex puzzle to the policy system. 
It has to make decisions regarding the physical 
system but some demands, wishes and practi-
cal possibilities are not compatible. In order to 
structure the information from the selection 
pressures they are subject to and to develop an 
assessment they can act upon, officials apply 
two selection mechanisms, namely boundary 
judgments and diversity of information. Each 
of these two mechanisms can be subdivided 
in two more subtypes. Within the selection 
mechanism of boundary judgments, officials 
can decide on their connections with other 
people, most notably opponents, and their 
composition, i.e., who are allowed to partici-
pate in the actual decision. Within the selec-
tion mechanism of diversity, officials can de-
cide on the research it requires and the scope 
of the project it intends to initiate. These selec-
tion mechanisms vary as the case evolves.
Conclusions
Following the tremendous societal resis-tance and physical problems, the authori-ties started to realize that the chosen 
route would not take them much closer to a 
new deepening. Consequently, they started a 
mediation process and started to rethink their 
continuous economic utilization of the river. 
Although it does not lead to a major change, 
yet, it is significant that for the first time they 
developed a long-term vision for the region and 
for the first time listened to input from oppo-
nents. This does not mean that all is now well 
but there are signs that some changes are taking 
place. The coevolutionary framework in this 
research shows that such a rethinking is nec-
essary because officials are not deciding over 
passive systems. Rather, they are entangled in 
patterns of reciprocal selection and they can be 
both architects of a new future and victims of 
their own decisions. Since the physical system 
does not necessarily comply, officials may be 
subjected to multiple pressures that they can 
only partially control. The outcomes of their 
decisions are often different from the original 
aim because the return is often dispropor-
tional to the action—as shown by the dramatic 
increase of sediment accumulation. In making 
decisions, officials are subjected to blind selec-
tion stemming from earlier decisions that have 
adverse effects, accidental changes and events. 
The relationship between these decisions and 
the actual outcomes is obscured because of 
complex causation. Future policy options are 
limited not by only by perceptible and deliber-
ate choices made by officials but, above all, by 
the actual physical developments—especially 
in this case where the new stable state proves 
to be persistent. To complicate matters fur-
ther: there is an erratic relationship between 
decisions and outcomes. Responses to deci-
sions do not evolve regularly but instead, dis-
play a punctuated nature with changes taking 
place elsewhere in time. Therefore, new situa-
tions can be relatively unexpectedly, especially 
when the new situation is unintended.
 This creates uncertainty. Officials re-
spond by altering the selection mechanisms 
and with that, the disposition of the policy sys-
tem. There are two archetypes of responses. 
 The singular response is characterized 
by the desire to connect with those who sup-
port the officials’ goals and by excluding those 
who oppose them. This results in a narrow 
scope of the project and consequently, in re-
search aimed exclusively at finding the means 
to that end. The main reason for this approach 
is an attempt to keep the project under control 
as it is considered complex enough as it is with-
out distracting factors. Any perceived threat 
to the original goal is actively diverted away. 
The case study shows this process as initial re-
sponse to safeguard the original plan to carry 
out another deepening. 
 However, such an approach can be ren-
dered intolerable if the selection pressures that 
were initially diverted backfire. Officials are 
then forced to alter their regime. The second 
type response is characterized by a composite 
nature. Officials then connect with other ac-
tors in order to expand the diversity of ideas 
and goals in the process. This results in a debate 
that questions the scope, subsequently tak-
ing into account more than one aspect of the 
physical system. Consequently, research is also 
aimed at exploring options rather than simply 
finding the means to a given end.
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 The case study shows that composite 
characteristics are encompassed within the 
singular responses but not always unlocked. 
Both types of responses are built around mul-
tiple actors, which creates the potential for 
more diversity. A more composite nature is 
also not the final state as officials can convert 
(back) into singularity. Change or consolida-
tion of regime is induced by actual unfavorable 
events or by the perceived imminent risk of 
such changes. 
 While a change or consolidation of sin-
gularity or composition may be a deliberate 
response, it has also been observed that both 
types of responses have the capacity to rein-
force their nature unintentionally. The sin-
gular response is driven by its self-referential 
nature that reconfirms its workings while the 
composite response is driven by further dissi-
pation in an attempt to be comprehensive. So 
it appears that decision-making processes are 
partly uncontrollable by the decision-maker. 
Possible future states of systems be compro-
mised through adverse, unintended results 
and events, and the nature of the responses can 
also change partly uncontrollably as a singular 
response can make people blind for its singu-
larity and a composite response may not be 
able to keep diversification that is created un-
der control. However, singular responses are 
less likely to take into account all the possible 
future states of the physical system. But com-
posite responses can not fully avoid the possi-
ble occurrence of unforeseen and unfavorable 
change. Only the probability of such develop-
ments can be reduced. However, reframing 
decision-making as coevolution helps officials 
understanding that decision-making is a mat-
ter of reciprocal selection, with the results not 
being fully determined by their intended se-
lections but rather, emerging from the entire 
complex process of reciprocal selections.
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